Another basic strategic interest of Ukraine vis-a-vis NATO is linked to those favourable conditions, which membership in the Alliance ensures for enhancing democratic values and development of civil society in our country. Therefore, the accession of Ukraine to NATO means the implementation of its civic interests. It means that Ukraine will join the European civilisation. The alternative could be the Eurasian direction, which presumes accession to the community of CIS countries with authoritarian or half-authoritarian regimes, "shadow" economies, marginalized and spiritually devastated societies.
The NATO membership provides strong guarantees of keeping the national identity and integrity for the Ukrainian nation. Being part of the community of civilised democratic member-nations will encourage formation of the Ukrainian national elite oriented towards national Ukrainian and European values as well as promotion of Ukrainian national culture and culture of Ukraine minorities.
In the context of implementation of the above-mentioned national interests the issues of security should be clearly specified since their solution is linked to the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. This paper specifically identifies new threats to regional security after the second wave of the NATO enlargement and mechanisms for their neutralisation; it evaluates the balance of forces in the region, highlights the unresolved border issues, illegal migration, territorial problems and inter-ethnic disputes.
Much attention should be paid to addressing the problem of foreign military presence. It is evident that the Russian military on the Ukrainian territory and the NATO membership of Ukraine are incompatible options since such presence goes contrary to the principle of collective defence of the Alliance. Therefore, the process of gaining the NATO membership by Ukraine requires elaboration of specific mechanisms, which could ensure the unchallenged withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea naval fleet from the territory of Ukraine. These mechanisms should Ix- implemented at both the international level and at the level of bilateral inter-governmental relations.
At the national level these mechanisms envisage the establishment of internal legal, economic and political conditions for the elimination of the Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine. The introduction of the following measures could create the legal pre-conditions, namely:
o bringing the activities of the Russian Black Sea naval fleet into compliance with the requirements of the Law of Ukraine "0n the procedure for admission and conditions of hosting the units of the armed forces of other nations on the territory of Ukraine;
o introducing monitoring violations of I he laws of Ukraine and the agreement that regulates the activities of the Russian Black Sea naval fleet formations on the territory of Ukraine;
o elaborating and implementing clear cut control mechanisms over the activities of the RF Black Sea naval fleet on the territory of Ukraine by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, other central and local bodies of executive power and local government.
As regards the economic pre-conditions, the whole range of challenging problems should be addressed:
Firstly, it is clear that proceeding from geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations Russia will use all possible leverage, in the first place economic tools, to maintain its military presence on the territory of Ukraine. One of the most effective levers in this respect is the use of strategic dependence of Ukraine on energy supplies from Russia. Therefore, the issue of diversification of energy sources is becoming critically important in addressing the problem of elimination of the Russian military presence and gaining the NATO membership by Ukraine.
Secondly, stationing of the RF Black Sea naval fleet on the territory of Ukraine is realised on lease-holding conditions as regards the land plots, facilities of coastal infrastructure and bay waters through annual repayments of part of the Ukrainian debt in the amount of US$ 75 mln. The total Ukrainian debt at the time of signing the Agreement was nearly US$ 2.2 bin. Over the past six years of lease holding the Russian side repaid US$ 587 mln. In the case of early withdrawal of the Black Sea naval fleet from the territory of Ukraine the issue of pre-scheduled repayment of the Ukrainian debt in the amount of US$ 1.5 bin will arise. Ukraine will not able to repay it within the short time-period without foreign assistance; Ukraine will need direct financial support from the USA and other NATO member-countries. Another way of repaying Ukrainian debts can be realised in the form of purchasing such debts from Russia by western countries or through repayment of Russian debts by NATO nations in exchange for the relevant liquidation of Ukrainian debts to Russia.
At the national level it is necessary to complete the inventoryof all real estate and some plots of land leased to the Russian Black Sea Navy and to draw up a list of all those facilities and plots of land, which have not been included into the Addendum to the Agreement, but are still being used by the military units of the Russian Black Sea Navy. Additional agreements should be made providing for their lease and relevant lease-holding payments.
Sub-lease by the Russian Black Sea Navy of any facilities and plots of land, provided for its own needs according to the Agreement, to whatever profit-making businesses should be prohibited. In case of refusal by the Russian side to pay for additional lease it is imperative to demand that it should gradually release all the, docks, plots of land and other similar facilities for the use by the city of Sevastopol.
Thirdly, following the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Navy from the territory of Ukraine, the problem of providing jobs to those Ukrainian citizens who had serviced the Russian military units will be high on the agenda. Around 2% of the working population of the city of Sevastopol are now employed in the area of servicing the Russian Black Sea Navy. Therefore, early measures to address the problem of employment for these people should be envisaged in the State programme for economic and social development of the city of Sevastopol. The implementation of this programme should bring about a significant demilitarisation of the